


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8 November 1963



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PROBABLE SOVIET ANTIMISSILE MISSILES

Approximately 50 feet long, these missiles were displayed publicly for the first time in the Moscow parade on 7 November.



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USSR: Four large missiles shown for the first time in yesterday's parade were described by Soviet spokesmen as antimissile missiles capable of "destroying the enemy's rockets in the air."

*The US attachés report the new missiles are two-stage with an estimated length of about 50 feet and a diameter varying from 30 to 40 inches. The booster stage, some 15 feet long, and the second stage sustainer, about 35 feet, both have very large fixed fins suggesting an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) mission.

[The missiles probably are the ones observed under canvas by Western attachés during parade rehearsals on 22 and 26 October.] TASS identified them as "long-range guided interceptors" and commented that "at recent exercises these long-range air defense rockets proved capable of hitting any up-to-date air-space attack weapons."

No other new weapons appeared in the parade.

Speeches by both General Staff Chief Biryuzov and Minister of Defense Malinovsky repeated the standard Soviet boasts of general military prowess and claims of new capabilities in both missile and conventional weapons.

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Iran-USSR: (Iran is showing increasing interest in harmonious relations with the Soviet Union.)

(An Iranian committee is considering a Soviet request, recently renewed, for mutual air and landing rights for regularly scheduled commercial aircraft. Iran has so far withheld overflight privileges and landing rights until the USSR guarantees full reciprocity, including permission for non-Iranian pilots to fly Iranian aircraft over Soviet territory.)

(Iran also recently agreed to negotiate the specifics of an overland transit agreement which was concluded in general terms nearly a year ago. Once the details are worked out, Iranian exports and imports may be shipped to and from European countries via the USSR.)

(Further talks may result from Soviet President Brezhnev's scheduled good-will visit to Iran in mid-November.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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Laos: Premier Souvanna Phouma returns to Laos today, after two months abroad, apparently determined to attempt again a reconciliation with the Pathet Lao.

Souvanna recently has expressed optimism that he can bring the Pathet Lao back into full participation in the coalition government. He apparently intends to renew his earlier proposal that the administrative capital be transferred, at least temporarily, to Luang Prabang, which would be demilitarized.

The two Pathet Lao ministers in the coalition, Prince Souphannouvong and Phoumi Vongvichit, have justified their self-exile in Khang Khay on the ground that their security cannot be assured in Vientiane as long as the city is under rightist control.

Although Souphannouvong last August rejected the proposal to neutralize Luang Prabang and move the coalition government there, Souvanna is optimistic that he may now agree. Souvanna claims to have received Soviet assurances of support for his plans during his recent visit to Moscow.

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British Guiana: Reacting to the setback Premier Jagan suffered at last week's constitutional talks, a government-sponsored union has begun a new campaign to capture control of the East Indian sugar workers.

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[redacted] the Guiana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU) is telling the sugar workers--a bloc comprising about half of organized labor--that this is their last chance to prevent the British from turning the country over to other races, thus depriving the East Indians of the benefits Jagan's party has gained for them. GAWU organizers are stressing racialism and intimidation, reportedly including death threats, to those sugar workers who do not join the GAWU.

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[redacted]

The People's Progressive Party (PPP) hierarchy itself has not yet reacted in any decisive way to London's requirement that new elections under British-supervised proportional representation be held before further discussion of independence. It is unclear to what extent the PPP endorses the present GAWU program.

Premier Jagan remained in London a few days to press for a definite independence date. Party chairman Benn returned to the colony on 5 November charging that Britain's "unprincipled decision portrays unbelievable subservience of the British to the US... whose fear of the PPP is almost paranoiac."

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DAILY BRIEF

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Greece: King Paul's mandate to Center Union (EK) leader Papandreou to form a government should result in a brief period of relative calm in Greek politics, although the situation remains basically unstable.

Papandreou, whose party won 140 of the 300 parliamentary seats in last Sunday's election, expects his government to be sworn in today. Since Parliament would not normally reconvene until early December, he should have a month in which to try to win enough defectors from the National Radical Union (ERE) of former Premier Karamanlis to assure a working majority.

[At present, it appears that the ERE will go along with a confidence vote rather than try to force a new election, since there is currently no strong issue for Karamanlis to exploit.] Moreover, the EK would probably come out of such an election even stronger than it is now. It would be likely to pick up votes from sympathizers who did not support Papandreou this time because they thought he would lose.

The pro-Communist United Democratic Left (EDA), which came in a weak third, also does not appear to have anything to gain from opposing Papandreou and seeking a new election at this time.

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USSR-Iraq: (A five-man Soviet military mission [redacted] arrived in Baghdad on 26 October for a month's stay to iron out problems in Soviet military aid to Iraq. The mission will review unfulfilled military contracts and decide on the disposition of surface-to-air missile equipment which has been packed for return to the USSR. Periodic Soviet military shipments are continuing, [redacted]

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Indonesia: The death of First Minister Djuanda is likely to revive factional maneuvering, principally among Security Minister General Nasution, Foreign Minister Subandrio, and Mining Minister Chaerul Saleh. Although Djuanda's role in government policy was slight in the period just before his death, he occasionally had exerted some restraining influence on President Sukarno, had supported the army's anti-Communist efforts, and was the leading proponent of economic stabilization with Western help. Sukarno may postpone appointing a replacement for Djuanda or may appoint a noncontroversial figure of lesser political standing in order to avoid factional feuding.

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Communist China - East Africa: Communist China appears confident that Kenya and Zanzibar will follow other former British colonies in Africa by recognizing Peiping soon after they become independent early next month. The Chinese are reported to have made unofficial inquiries already about offices for a diplomatic mission in Zanzibar. According to the US Consulate General in Nairobi, top Kenyan leaders have informally agreed to recognize Peiping, and the Chinese may offer Kenya several hundred vocational training scholarships as an independence gift. [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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